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BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES.

By Clifton R. Wooldridge. Published by the author, Chicago, 1908. Pp. 608.
This book narrates the experiences of a successful detective in
the "wickedest city in the world." It gives a valuable insight into
the methods of crime and the ways of detecting and punishing criminals. In addition to the exciting stories which fill a large part of
the book there are serious discussions of such topics as graft, our
penal system, vagrancy, methods of identifying criminals, the criminal rich, gambling and various other subjects, by one who has had
a large experience in dealing with crime and criminals.
TWENTY YEARS A DETECTIVE.-

Fixs'r
LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE

NATIONAL

CONFERENCE ON CRI-MINAL

Published for the American Institute
of Criminal Law and Criminology, 87 E. Lake St., Chicago,
1910. Pp. XXVIII, 221.
The conference was held in the Northwestern University Law
school building, June 7. and 8, 1909. At the first general session
addresses were delivered by Prof. Roscoe Pound, Justice Orin Carter
of the Illinois" Supreme' Court, President .Harris of Northwestern
University, and James Hagerman, Esq., of St. Louis. For the
consideration of the topics submitted the conference divided itself
into three sections: one on the treatment of offenders; one on organization, appointment and training of officials, and one on criminal
law and procedure: The proceedings contain a stenographic report of the discussions which took place in each of' the sectional
meetings, in the two general sessions and in the committee on resolutions. The work of the conference as a whole was reviewed in the
lay number of this JOURNAL.
By C. E. Fanning. The H. W. Wilson
Conipany, Minneapolis, 1909. Pp. 171.
This is a little volume in the debaters' handbook series and contains a collection of the best articles written for and against capital
punishment. It is a useful compilation for students and debating
societies. In addition to the collection of articles there is a select
bibliography of the literature of capital punishment.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.

KNOWN TO THE POLICE.

By Thomas Holmes. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1908. Pp. IX, 267.
This volume by the secretary of the Howard Association is
made up of a number of unrelated chapters and makes no claim to
495

PRINS: LA DEFENSE SOCIALE.

being a scientific contribution to the subject. What value it has,
grows out of the fact that it is an intimate personal account of the
writer covering a quarter of a century, and dealing with all classes
of offenders against the criminal law.
At a time when emphasis is being placed, in an increasing way,
on the importance of viewing many offenders in court, as possible
social assets, it is interesting to find the author declaring against the
accepted method of magistrates in dealing with the repeater, of the
police courts; against the uselessness of short terms of imprisonment
for the habitual drunkard and against the fatuous practice of trying
to correct the so-called "Hooliganism of the Poor" by increasing
the severity of punishment in court instead of providing sane means
of filling leisure time.
The reviewer may be permitted at the same time to express
disappointment at the author's impatient attitude toward probation
as a method of dealing with a certain class of offenders. The subject~is too important in every way to be summarily disposed of in
a few paragraphs.
BERNARD FLEXNE.i.
Louisville, Ky.
par
A. Prins. Misch et Thron, Bruxelles, 1910. Pp. 170.
The title of this book suggests mental adjustments to modifications in law and the discussion fulfils the promise. With the attacks on the "classical" methods we need not here concern ourselves;
the constructive argument is of supreme interest in America. The
author, who was associated with Professors von Liszt and von Hamel
in foinding the Association of Criminalists, has won a right as a
jurist to a respectful hearing.
The principle underlying his argument is this: "We ought to
combat all. the manifestations of criminality by judicial or social
measures of defense, and the high mission of the state in this domain
is to reconcile the possible maximum of social security with the
possible minimum of individual suffering." The measure of penalty
according to responsibility and guilt cannot be defined, and thus
expiation is impossible; all that can be required is protection of
social interests. It is not even desirable to wait for the commission
of crimes. So long as the courts released children and youth on
the ground of limited responsibility the'y helped to push them into
crime; the present policy is to protect them from ruinous influences.
The author urges a similar policy in relation to degenerates, epileptics, inebriates, sexual perverts and their kind, who are a menace
to social order and security even though they have not yet technically
committed crimes. Confirmed criminals should be treated on the
basis of their character as a menace to society; and suitable specialization of institutions would enable the administration to restrain
LA DEFENSE SOCIALE ET LES TRANSFO.MATIONS DU DROIT PENAL,

FOLSOM: STUDIES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.

and improve the offenders according to their various dispositions.
The book is a vigorous and powerful protest against the immense
wrong done to society and to offenders themselves by permitting
them to go free after a brief sentence which is measured by the
amount stolen rather than by the attitude of the wrongdoer to the
community.
The author considers the usual objections to this view based on
the danger to individual liberty and shows that nothing he proposes
could equal the capricious and arbitrary treatment of offenders under the traditional scheme; and he also shows how the indeterminate
C. R. H.
sentence can be safeguarded against possible abuses.
STUDIES OF CRi MINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LIMIITED RESPONSIBILITY.

By Charles Follen Folsom, A. M., M'. . New York: Privately
printed, 1909. Pp. 15].
No one who is familiar with the careful, painstaking life work
of the late Dr. Folsom can read the above-mentioned volume without wishing that the author might longer have been spared to finish
the work commenced in these studies. It is plainly patent to his
friends and readers that most of this work is done in outline only,
and is much in need of careful and systematic revision, as well as
supplement, before it can have great value to the worker in medicolegal fields.
For instance, in the first case reported there is complete lack of
information concerning the family or personal history of Jesse
Pomeroy. While this may all have been common knowledge at the
time of its happening and in the vicinage of its occurrence, it is
quite true that at the present time and in more or less remote
districts, knowledge of this early history, if had at all, is vague and
indefinite. To the student it is more important to have the facts
in the case than the deductions-therefrom. Indeed, without these
facts the reader can make no reasonable deduction of his own, but
must accept or deny the one prepared for him.
The report of case No. 2 represents a fairly typical case of
chronic delusional insanity of the now familiar paranoiac type. The
autopsy findings show also chronic brain disease, thus confirming
the diagnosis of deterioration, if any confirmation were needed. In
this case the question of diagnosis is. far simpler than that of case
thorough study -of the individual, aside from her
No. 6, where
criminal acts, would scarcely justify any such conclusion as was
finally reached. Yet the wisdom of the judicial finding was ultimately proven.
The six cases, however, taken as a whole, show histories more
or less typical of the classes of cases which from time to time
attract so much attention in our American courts. These cases are
always attended with much publicity and lead to numerous and
-a

497.

GRASSET:

SEMI-INSANE AND SEMI-RESPONSIBLE.

varied debates and discussions, both lay and scientific. All this
attention tends toward the formation of a sound public opinion, and
any contribution, however small, which throws light in such an
obscure field as that of mental responsibility, is quite worth reading
and carefully considering.
ROBERT B. LAMB.
Matteawan, N. Y.
THE SE-II-INSANE AND THE SpMI-REsPONsIBLtE.

By Joseph Grasset.
Translated into English by Dr. $mith Ely Jelliffe. New York
and London.: Funk & WVagnalls, 1907. Pp. 415.
The introduction to Dr. Grasset's work sets forth its divisions,
which are five in number. The first is devoted to establishing the
semi-insane as a distinct class. The second, to the refutation of
the arguments made against this proposition. The third refers to
the clinical demonstrations and medical study of the type. The
fourth shows their social value; the last their danger to the social
body.
After going over the entire book one is struck by the number
of well-known theories (many of which are legendary in character
and can scarcely be accepted as scientific facts) here repeated. In
no other place are they so collectively shown nor is their reading
elsewhere made more agreeable. But while newly dressed and attractively presented, the information contained has, in the major
part, long been available under other headings.
Decidedly ingenious is the arrangement of the psychisms into
two component parts. First, the "superior psychism," which presides over conscious and voluntary acts. Second, the "inferior
psychism," which has a similar relation to automatic and involuntary
acts. But one may well ask wherein this differs essentially from
the old theory of primary and secondary ganglia and their general
relation to the nervous system as a whole. ' Grasset points out that
in certain examinations one is to consider whether one has or has
not to deal with a sound or a diseased psychic neuron. The psychic
neuron, however, is not established hs a definite entity. Without the
creation of a normal standard and-its plain recognition, how then
may we hope to perceive the invasion of a pathological condition?
There can be little doubt in the mind of any reader as to the
great value of the work done by 'th6se of highly nervous organization. Theirs is a necessary part in the whole complex. They perform a work impossible for the phlegmatic. The demands made by
them on their nervous capital are all out of proportion -to its
supporting strength. Small wonder, then, that a breakdown occurs
and that they who have formerly been simply "neurotic" become
actually deranged. Criminal acts may follow the change. Shall
punishment or treatment follow, or shall the two be combined? As
a matter of fact, in the older parts of the United States this ques498

MONGERI

PRINCIPI

DI PSICOPATOLOGIA LEGALE.

tion of responsibility is yearly receiving more consideration. Those
who have most to do with the criminal see in him many of the same
characteristics reported by Grasset, by him grouped and designated
as belonging to the semi-insane class. From the standpoint of
medical jurisprudence it is a grave question whether this classification is at all necessary or even desirable. Certainly the modern
works on mental disease offer sufficient latitude in classification to
satisfy the most exacting.
If a new tendency appears, its chief merit would be in the way
of simplification and directness, rather than toward overelaborationwhich in no wise assists the perplexed physician or jurist to d-tzmine questions of responsibility.
A double conclusion seems justifable. First, that Dr. .Grasset
has made a wonderfully interesting collection of matorial bearing
on the neurotic class. Second, that the class is by no means new,
and that the name suggested fails to clarify or make more definite
our knowledge of those long known to be other than wholly normal.
ROBERT B. LAMB.
Mlatteawan, N. Y.
PRINCIPI DI PSICOPATOLOGIA LEGALE.
Ulrico Hoepi, 1908. Pp. 421.

By Luigi Mongeri. Milan:

The medico-legal aspect of mental disorders is sufficiently important to warrant its treatment as an independent subject, and not
merely incidentally in the course of a general text-book on psychiatry. One would expect, however, that in such independent treatment of the legal questions in psychopathology the wider aspects
of the subject would be thoroughly discussed, and an endeavor made
to define the fundamental principles which should be applied in each
particular situation. The author adopts a different standpoint;
after one chapter devoted to the legal provisions of the*Civil and
the Penal Code in Ifaly, with which he compares those of other
nations, he takes up the whole topic of legal psychopathology under
the headings of the various psychoses. A short description of each
clinical group is given; this is followed by a discussion of the civil
capacity and criminal responsibility of patients in this group. The
classification'adopted by the author is somewhat hybrid; we find
included both the dementia praecox of Kraepein and the frenosi
sensoria of Bianchi, while the discarded "secondary dementia" is here
given a respectable position and illustrated by a superfluous case.
The medico-legal aspects of mania, melancholia, periodic psychoses,
and maniac-depressive insanity are discussed under the heading of
each single group, for which there is no adequate ground. It is
obvious that this method involves a large amount of unnecessary
repetition.
While the discussion of the medico-legal questions is always
sober and indicates common sense, it remains somewhat general,

OSBORN.

QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS.

while greater definition would be welcome; thus the author's remarks
on the testamentary capacity in aphasia might with advantage
have been made more precise. To the jurist the work may be useful as a book of reference with brief descriptions of the recognized
forms of mental disorder and illustrative cases; it is rather a psychiatric manual with medico-legal coloring, than a serious exposition of the principles of legal psychopathology.
Ward's Island, N. Y.
C. MAcFIE CA-pmDiELL.
QUESTIO ED DOCUMENTS:
DOCUMENTS,
FACTS

MAY

A

STUDY AND ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONED

WITH AN

OUTLINE OF METHODS BY WHICH THE
3E DISCOVERED AND SHOWN.
By Albert S. Osborne.

With an introduction by Prof. John H. -rigmore. Rochester,
N. Y.: Lawyers' Codperative Publishing Co., 1910.
Pp.
XXIV, 501.
Mr. Osborn's book is a study in what is, if not a new, a little
worked field in legal literature-that of the application of science
and scientific methods in the trial of issues of fact. A court room
cannot be made into a scientific laboratory and the facts of science
can only be-proven in trials, as all other facts are, by the testimony
of observers. The law has, however, fully recognized the necessity
f6r such proof. It must be a satisfaction to the legal profession to
find such an experienced expert as Mr. Osborn bearing testimony to
this fact. He says: "There is always violent opposition to any
innovation in legal processes, but the science of law has kept abreast
of the progress of the physical sciences by the recognition and
employment of any improved methods by means of which the facts
may be more clearly shown."
The legal profession has not, however, been so progressive in
attaining the ability to utilize and present intelligently such testimony in actual trials, and at least a very laige share of the prevalent dissatisfaction with expert testimony must be attributed to this
fact.
"The lawyer," he says, "should have this speci.1 knowledge in
order also that he may be able to utilize effectively testimony on the
subject that he may wish to present: that he may be qualified to
test in advance the force and truth of such testimony, and finally
and most important of all, that he may be prepared to cross-examine
adverse witnesses with intelligence and skill. A case is always in
grave danger if an attorney is trying by the aid of witnesses to get
before a jury that Which he himself does not clearly understand.
The successful lawyer is he who not only knows the law, but knows
the facts, and when he is able to quote the first and prove the
second he is ready for trial."
'It Would be well if these sentences could be brought home to the
full comprehension of every trial lawyer who has'to present scien.500
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QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS.

tific evidence to a jury. It is to aid in the acquisition of full knowledge of the facts in inquiries as to the genuineness of documents that
this book is written. It is therefore a pioneer in its field. With
the exception of treatiAes on I'Iedical Jurisprudefice we have no
legal literature on any of the sciences in their relation to law, and
none whatever of a similar plan and scope to the present worki
After a classification of the variousikinds of questioned documents
the author treats of standards of comparison, of photography, the
microscopic and other instruments and appliances used in the study
of handwriting and then of the various technical elements of writing
such as movements, line quality, alignment, pen position, pressure
and shading and arrangement, size, spacing and slant in writing.
'Writing instruments, the various .systems of writing, variety of forms
and mathematical calculations applied to questioned writing are
next considered. These chapters are pyeparatory and lead up to a,
full discussion in separate chapters of simulated and copied forgeries,
traced forgeries, and anonymous and disputed letters. Supplemental
to this discussion the author treats of ink and paper in relation to
writing, of methods ,of determining the sequence of writing, erasures
and alterations, additions and interlineations, of -the age of documents and of methods of detecting forged typewriting. Finally,
there is a chapter on the conduct of a questioned document case n
court.
In the chapter on "Standards of Comparison,"
ir. Osborn
shows the necessity for a sufficient number of specimens of genuine
writing as standards in order to form a correct judgment. The
common practice of bankers of basing a conclusion as to a suspected
signature on a comparison with only one genuine signature he
characterizes as dangerous.
Normal variations in handwriting,
variations in writing done at different times and for different purposes and under different conditions make necessary the examination
of a considerable number of specimens to learn the habits of writing
of any writer. Absence of proper standards is the ceuse of much
of the discredit that has at times been brought upon handwriting
testimony. Under the rule foxnmerly obtaining, that genuine writing could not be offered in evidence merely for the purpose of comparison, this was often inevitable. Most of the states now, however,
permit the introduction of standards -of comparison in handwriting
cases.
Throughout the book the author-lays stress on the importance
in expert testimony not of the mere opinion of the expert, but of.
the reasons on which it is based. IHe says: "The primary purpose
and function of questioned document expert testimony is not to foist
a ready-made opinion on court and jury, but to assist the jury in
reaching a correct interpretatiofh of the facts before them. The

WULFFEN:: PSYCHOLOGIE DES VERBRECHERS.

importance of the bare opinion given by the witness should be constantly minimized and the reasons for the opinion should be elaborated and emphasized. . . Two mere opinions in conflict may fieutralize each other, but this is not usually true of two reasons."
This is certainly true and properly understood, and carried
out would go far toward meeting the criticisms of expert testimony
which now prevail. But precisely here isnecessary not only ability
and candor on the part 'of the witness, but also thorough preparation on the part of the attorney, and the ability to understand and
afford the witness the opportunity to bring out the facts on which
his opinion is based. This is a very different thing from argument
from the witness stand; it is but furnishing to the jury, the aid it
should have both in estimating the value of the expert's opinion and
in furnishing a proper basis for intelligently determining the questions on which it must pass.
It is to be hoped that other sciences in their legal applications
may receive similar elucidation. A book on the subject of insanity
-in trials on a similar plan and scope and prepared with equal ability
in its field would assist greatly in remedying the present unsatisfactory state of opinion on that subject. Such books are badly needed,
and the present work will prove of great value both to lawyer and
E. L.
expert in all investigations of disputed handwritings.
PSYCHOLOGIE

DES

VERBiEECHERS,

EIN

HANDBUcQ

FUR JURISTEN,

ARzTE, PEDAGOGEN UND GEDILDETE ALLER STANDE. By Dr.
Erich.Wulffen. Staatsanwalt in Dresden. Gross-LichterfeldeOst, Dr. R. Langenscheidt, about 1908. Vol. I, pp. XXVII,

44; Vol. II, pp. 546.
This work is a part of the "Encyklopiidie der modernen Kriminaistik"-a series of expert investigations into the history and the
scientific basis of criminology-and serves as a sort of introduction,
both for lawyers and laymen, to a more comprehensive study and
a jtster consideration of the minds of criminals and other legal
offenders. '
"The author's aim is twofold: '(1) To review the work done
thus fat and the results already obtained, and (2) to indicate the
.problems still to be solved and to suggest what seem to him the
most promising ways of meeting them.
The general method is to take up in order the following disciplines: Physiological Psychology, Psychiatry, Anthropology, Criminal Statistics, Social Ethics,, and Characterology, and to show in
how far each subject may contribute to a better understanding of
the accused, his deeds, and his motives, implying that such knowledge will eventually lead to a fairer administration of justice and
to a greater effectiveness of legal punishment. With admirable insight the author has in each case trusted to the guidance of the
502

WULFFEN:

PSYCHOLOGIE DES VERBRECHERS.

best authorities, whose systems or points of view he presents with
clearness and conciseness, stating where they agree and disagree,
and wisely suspending judgment where facts are still lacking.
In the case of Physiology and Psychology (Chapter I), he
could have made no better choice than to follow W. Wundt's "Principles pf Physiological Psychology," "Outlines of Psychology,"
and "Logic." From these works our author has selected and presented in condensed form such material as seems to be most useful
to the practical criminologist. In many cases he has added striking illustrations from law, e. g., irresponsible excess of self-defense
as a case of reflex--movement with little or no conscious apperception,
etc. In the discussion of the experiments on self-betrayal by delayed, inhibited or significant associations of ideas, he avoids dogmatic partiality and is ready to await further experimentation.
In Psychiatry (Chapter 11),' our author bases his statements
on the works of v. Krafft-Ebing, Hans Gross, Forel, Kraepelin, and
other authorities. He quotes many criminal cases illustrating various mental defects and the way in which they may lead to crime.
Here he also finds opportunity for deploring the young lawyer's
inability to comprehend and appreciate the testimony of expert
psychiatrists. He devotes some 25 pages to the psychology of alcobol, quoting various statistical data from the works of Kraepelin and
his pupils, Dr. A. Smith and Dr. C. Furer, who constructed tables of
frequency for internal, external, and rimed associations, showing
that the last kind is by far the most preponderant under alcoholic
influence.
In the third chapter, under Anthropology, our author discusses
at some length Lombroso's theory of congenital criminals and their
relation to moral insanity and epilepsy. Among Lombroso's strongest opponents are cited Dr. A. Baer, Dr. P. N~icke, and Bruno Stern.
Sommer's theory receives special emphasis because it separates the
question whether some of the criminals have an inherited disposition
for crime, from the other question, whether certain morphological
criteria distinguish the first class of criminals from other offenders.
Sommer affirms the first question, thus far agreeing with Lombroso's
theory and showing how even Baer furnishes evidence, against his
own will, in favor of this aspect of Lombroso's theory. But the second question is answered in the negative by Sommer, and Wulffen
seems to agree with him, indicating that common sense has in this
respect vaguely anticipated the same answer.
Chapter IV deals with criminal statistics of the German empire.
By cautious interpretation of the figures, Wulffen shows how they
indicate certain chronological and geographical tendencies in the
occurrence of crime.
His chief authority for the ethics of crime (Ch. V) is Wundt,

WVADLER:

VERBRECHENSBEWEGUNG

though -other w-riters are quoted.

I9

OSTLICHEN

EUROPA.

In the discussion of the freedom

of the. will and determinism lies perhaps -the weakest point of the
whole work, although the next .chapter, on Characterology, is also.
less satisfactory than those of the first volume. Of especial criminological value are -the last two chapters, the
psychology of special crimes and criminal specialists, and the
-psychologiy ofcriminal procedure and execution of judgment (Strafvolzug). In the former the author presents a psychological analysis
of the minds and motives of the various criminal offenders from the
primitive thief and xobber to the modern automobile delinquent. The
last chapter shows how necessary it is for judges and jurors to know
how the mental state of an accused may be affected by the preliminary pxoceedings, the trial, and the final punishbment. Especially in
t-he case of the main trial -he iinds much ground for complaint. because of the Jack of psychological tact and insight exhibited by
many lawyers. He deplores the severity of the present penal code
and hopes that in some future time capital punishment may be dispensed with. Concerning the treatment of convicts be has words
Of praise for several American institutions, e. g., the state prison at
Jackson, Mich., and the Elmira Reformatory.
The final conclusion of this instructive work may be summed up
thus: Immoral and criminal actions are niecessary psychological and
social factors in the ethical development of the human race And must
be understood and treated in the same scientific spirit that pervades
the xest of human life and leads through failure to success.
Cornell University.
L. R. GEissLER.

DmI

VnRIBRECHENnSEWXGUNG IN OSTLICHEN EUROPA.
KRIMINALITAT DEn BALKANLANDER.

EnI

I

BEITRAG

BAND:

ZUr

DIE

IiTER-

NATIONALEW VERRIERENSKUNDE UND ZUR METHODE hnR aumMIT 107 TABELLEN -UND 12 DIAGRAMMEN.
Dr.
Arnold Wadler. .Hans Sachs Verlag, Munchen, 1908. Pp. 261.
This work presents a new field for- criminology, that is Eastern
Europe, which is full of mLxed nationalities with many and various
political, social, and religious divisions. It is extremely favorable -to
. statistical study of the various factors in criminality.
The first
volume of this work is entitled -"Criminality in -the Balkan Countries."
-The second volume, not yet published, is to treat of "Criminality in
Russia."
In the statistics of crime in the Balkan countries one of the
most notable characteristics is the relatively large number of persons
acquitted as compared with western lands. Also there is a predominance of crimes of bl.oodshed. It is not so much cunning and deceit
as violence which is manifested in the crime of these countries. The
Balkan lands are largely agricultural and are especially sensitive to
variations in the price of grain, as Indian corn. Thus from 1887 to
I-NALSTATISTIK

MINER:
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1905 the rise and fall of the price of corn is almost identical with the
line for increase of crime against property, showing conclusively a
direct relation.
Here crime among women is relatively the smallest of any country in Europe. Economic conditions seem to have little influence on
women's crimes, which are mainly against the person and morality,
and not so much against property.
Another peculiarity is that married persons show 9 higher per
cent of crime against the person than against property,, while the
contrary is true with people in general. Widows and divorced
-women show a much higher per cent of crime than other women.
Sexual crimes are comparatively small in number. This is in all
probability due to the custom of early marriages.
Since the Balkan countries are agricultural, crimes or offenses
against the forest laws and cattle stealing are numerous as compared
with other crimes. The influence of education on crime is of secondary moment. It is so- closely connected with, other sociological
factors that its influence cannot be differentiated. The distinguishing characteristics of crime in these countries which have been given
are satisfactorily shown in numerous tables.
ARTHUR MAcDoxA-NL.
Washington, D. C.
PTtOn3'ATXON WORK IN THE IIAGfSTRATES'

CoUi ts

By Ataudd¥ E. Milei'. New Yoek City:

O-F NEW Yoxi1 City.
New York PIrbbation

Association, 165 West Tenth Street, December, 1909. Pp. 23.
This pamphlet by the secretaty of the New York PFdbation
Association, who was fodi several years probation officer in the New
York City Night Court, describes the otganization and methods of
carrying on probation work- in the city magistrates' courts in the
Boroughs of Manhattan and The Bronx. Miss Miner has Vrorked
largely among women offenders, and her experience and observations
show that it is desirable to have women offenders, who are on probation, placed under the charge of women probation officers. She
declares that her probation work has been most successful with girls
from sixteen to twenty years of age wha are becoming wayward
through bad associations, and- with certain cases of young women
convicted of public intoxication. Probation, when appliedto hardcered prostitutes, is useless and tends to bring discredit upon the system. Most of the failures in the applicafion of probation in the city
magistrates' courts are said to be due to the lack of preliminary
investigation and to the indiscriminate selection of defendants for
probationary treatment. The pamphlet gives cases to show that the
probation system becomes farcical unless the magistrates use it intelligently. It also points out other defects in the probation system in
the New York City Magistrate's courts, as carried on in-1909, and
A. W. T.
makes recommendations for its improvement.

NAKENS:

MI PASO PAR LA CARCEL.

By Josi Nakens. Madrid: Imprenta de
'Domingo Blanco, 1909. Pp. 351.
It is impossible for a stranger to judge a book like this. The
writer"of this note visited the prison described, in the spring of 1909,
and was shown about everywhere as freely as he would be in America. The criticism of this volume attacks with asperity the cellular
isolation, .the neglect of food and clothing of prisoners, and various
abuses. None of this did the visitor see last year; yet, it may exist.
The author of the book admits that Dr. Rafael Salillas made important improvements, but contends that gross evils persist. A newspaper critic of November, 1909, declaires that such a'revelation in
the United States would stir the public to indignation and produce
instant reform.. He does not, however, know the situation.. The
word of a prisoner or ex-convict is too heavily discounted the world
over to weigh against the denials of wardens, chiefs of police and
state boards. But we may well flatter ourselves that such an exposure would here lead to official inquiry. The shameful and dangerous.
condition of many of our city lockups and jails shows how impervious is the conscience of our people where law-breakers 'are concerned. Even when our city authorities know these evils, they either
fail to apply any proper standard or they accept disease-breeding
conditions with fatalistic apathy. Therefore the caustic style of
Jos6 Nakens might be legitimately employed even in our cities.
C. R. H.
THEs CRimiNAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LUNATICs. A STUDY IN COMPARATIvE LAw. THEsIs APPROVED FOR THE DEGREE OF DoCTOR
oF LAws IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON. By Heinrich Oppenheimer. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Limited; 1909. Pp. V,
275.
The author of this volume starts with the question, "What is
Criminal Responsibility" (p. 1-18), and gives a statement of the
English and foreign laws .(p. 19-79) and a general survey (p. 8090). This leads over to the questions: "Should Insanity exempt
from Criminal Responsibility in any circumstances?" "Should all
lunatics without exception be exempted from Criminal Responsibility?" .Then comes the discussions of the general legal problem,
of the knowledge test, the "freedom of will," "power of self-control,"
"moral insanity," "partial insanity," the mitigation of punishment,
the critical moment when insanity excuses, conclusions, and a discussion of the evidence and of lunacy experts.
In the main, the book is a defense of the knowledge test and the
formulation of the law as it stands since the MacNaghten case.
The book presents a legal argument with little sympathy for
the "law as it ought to be," and without casuistic material of the
actual working of the conflicting principles in comparable cases
Afi

PASO PAR LA CARCEL.

OPPENHEIMER:

CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LUNATICS.

with contrasts, and concrete- discussion of results. While tb most
of us the issue turns on what is finally done with the individuals under
consideration, Oppenheimer limits the discussion strictly to the" concept of "criminal responsibility," even to the extent of pr!ferring
the question: "Is the person responsible in the sense of being liable
by the'law of England as it is, to be convicted of the crime with
which he is charged," to that formulated by Sir James Stephen: "Is
this person responsible in the sense of being liable
. . . to be
punished for the act he has done?" The term crimiial responsibility
is taken in its legal sense only (and only as far as it concerns conviction), "not in a metaphysical" and not even a practical sefise of
the term-hence the somewhat disappointing character of the book
as mainly an argument about various laws involving the concept of
"criminal responsibility of lunatics," rather than a review of the
facts and a discussion of their legal and practical and medical aspects of dealing with the crimes of the insane.
The feeling which calls forth so many debates just now is that
the legitimate expectations of the practical mind are not fulfilled
by the current practice and that possibly the law is not as it ought
to be-a statement easily justified, e. g., with regard to the selfcontradictory and straddling New York law. The question how
should we frame a satisfactory law and procedure would certainly
have to be preceded by a study of the cases in which one law or procedure or another has obviously failed to satisfy common-sense at
its best, followed by an inquiry as to how different methods might
have done better justice and what role the concept "of "crimnal responsibility" could reasonably play. If an inquiry into mere principles satisfies a reader, he finds not only a most interesting summar'y of the various pertinent laws but a very able criticism of practically all except the English principles.
The collection of laws and their survey offers many remarkable
facts. From the Chinese law which holds the insane (and their relatives) responsible for their acts (although usually with commutation of the punismment, and the law of Basel and a few other Swiss
cantons, which does not mention insanity, but onl:* the inability to
be aware of the criminality of the act or lack of self-determination,
we pass through all gradations to the sweeping statement of the
French code which directly and unreservedly identifies insanity and
irresponsibility.
In discussing the question whether insanity should exempt from
responsibility under any circumstances, Oppenheimer takes issue with
Smith, who advocates the execution of certain insane criminals or
homicidal lunatics. Oppenheimer insists upon "guilt" as the only
possible justification of punishment, and punishment as the only
justification for taking life. He assumes that the defense of in507
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sanity is met with only in, the most heinous of crimes and never in
mno" indictments) which is- certainly not true for the European
continent' but possible for England and probable in the United
States, because their commitment to a hospital is obtainable witho t any further ado, or because the prosecution for minor delicts
is oftener avoided as too troublesome to bother with under our cum.bersome judicial methods. The plea of insanity, as a mere plea, is
iiYdeed rarely made, unless there is a chance to evade the hospital or
t e~k3ape' something worse. According to, Oppenheimer, if insanityisaccepted punishment should be excluded because the taking of
life might otherwise: have to be jiistified under far less plausible eonditions7 as well. What shall. be done instead of punishment is a practical issue which Oppenheimer does not take up. Fersonally, the
revievier - fe6ls that: we might safely trust the abnormal individual
with the burden of the consequences of his abnormality, without exposing him to great unfairfiess. A person who has once or repeatedly sh-own a liability to misdeeds which are beyond his control ought
to, be made to feel his responsibility toward society, instead of being
deldared" "not guilty" and then let free or kept in check in the face
of the verdict, and yet at times for no other reason but for having
committed' that dangerous act. The general tendency to leniency
-would surely obviate any obvious injustice. But these are, of course,
not issues of "-criminal responsibility" in Oppenheimer's sense.
The- first problem naturally turns on the difficulty of defining
whi'at shall pass as insanity. Savage says: "The physician claims
as a general principle that an insane person, whatever his delusions
or other mental symptoms may be, must be considerd altogether irresponsible for any criminal act he may commit." (Good instances
of difference from this opinion are given in C. F. Folson, Studies of
Criminal Responsibility and Limited Responsibility, privately
printed, 1909.) The trouble is thai the term "insane" is too loose
and relative, covers many degrees and imperceptible transitions and,
therefore, even in France, with its out and out identification of irresponsibility and insanity, the judge, not the physician, presumes
to be- the one to decidd whether the existing disorder is insanity, and
therefore implicitly irresponsibility. French reports are said to record many cases in which a confirmed lunatic has been condemned,
because the judge can, after all, decide "according to his- own sweet
will and pleasure." With the physician, the problem is apt to-become merely one of whether the person is normal or abnormal; the
law', however, calls for a distinction of responsibility or irresponsibility, which finally turns on a psychological issue, and is therefore,
ccording"to Oppenheimer, outside of medicine-a view at variance
with the conception of those of us who include psychology among
the biological and medical sciences.
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To trace the relation of the mental disorder to the act is "a
task which lies quite outside the province and competence of medical science." "The problem becomes a legal one at the exact stage
at which it passes beyond the ken of the physician," and Oppenheimer assumes that he has thus given a cleat line of demarcation
between medicine and law. "It ought to be enough for the professional witness- to show that
the prisoner does not possess
suffiient intelligence to understand what h is d6ing, not sufficient
self-control to restrain his impulses, not that freedom of will which
would-enable him to regulate his conduct

.

.

.

; it is for the

judge and jury to draw therefrom the inference in relation to the
deed with which the prisoner is charged" (p. 137). In this it ig
difficult to see how the physician cbuld argue about these general
questions except by taking up definitely observed instances of the
person's actions and utterances. Why, then, should he not be competent to analyze the act under consideration as well? Oppenheimer
wants further to limit these psychological tests to the persons with
insanity. "I have not a single word of praise to say in favor of
those codes which lay down general psychologieal canots, of irresponsibility"-i. e., a plan which might, according to the reviewer's
own judgment, serve well because it would eliminate the quibbling
over what shall be called insanity and what not, inevitably leading
to a petitio principil. A satisfactory formulAion of the problem
of "intent" would do away with part of the difficulty.
The knowledge test, characteristic of the ]tnglish law, can be
reduced to, two elements: that of the nature of the act and that of
the act being wrong, legally or morally or both. The knowledge
of the nature of the act presupposes, according to Oppenheimer,
awareness of the identity of the actor and the true nature of the
material objects. There must be a knowledge of the abstract principles of the law or an ability to surmise or divine the provisions,
and "to subsume a concrete act under its proper legal category," a
knowledge of the criminality of the act and-Oppenheimer considers this an excellent formula which concentrates the legal theory
of criminal responsibility in a nutshell-capacity to understand the
law's threat. Much of the criticism of the knowledge test comes
from the mistaken notion that the test should be a criterion of"insanity, while it aims directly at responsibility itself. Blandford
criticizes the test for going beyond what can, be decided by medical
scoience. However this may be, Oppenheimer considers it "easier to'
reproduce another man's fhought, sane or insatleo than his feelings,
nis emotions, his impulses, his desires, or the "dictates of his will."
.;
The freedom of will and the power of self-control appear
to him infinitely more difficult to argue about. Concerning partial
insanity and partial responsibility, Oppenheimer insists on the ne909
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cessity of having clean-cut boundaries in law, and comforts us with
the statement that "it is long since an undoubted lunatic was
hanged."
This, I am afraid, is not altogether true. Guitean and Prendergast are cases in point. Public sentiment may have been right in
these cases to demand its satisfaction. But the law should be adapted.
to meet such emergencies in order to avoid general confusion and
actual breaking of the law. As a physician, I can easily see that
wheke we deal with an iiredeemable and permanent characteristic
of bn abnormal individual, with the pride and the conviction of his
cussedness; a definite measure of "punishment" may be the iorreal and justified demand of the public that looks for the deterring
effect of justice, wheras, it would probably be easy nowadays to
prevent a brutal attack of retaliation -dpon a person who had committed a crime in a transitory attack of genuine mental disorder.
The issue might at least be debatable and would probably not often
be raised. It would undoubtedly be safer for society to uphold the
dread of punishment even in the "irresponsible" and to make the decision after the act instead of as a general amnesty.
In the discussion of evidence he gives a praisewbi-thy approval
to a departure of American jurisprudence in discussing the presumptions of the law.' "Persons prima facie must be taken to be of
sound mind till the contrary is shown ;" but there are differices of
opinion, where insanity is proved, whether slight proof is sufficient,
or whether "the proof of insanity to acquit should be as strong as
the proof of guilt to convict." At any rate a prisoier who sets up
the plea of insanity has to prove: "(1) That he is of unsound mind.
Having satisfactorily established this, he must show further (2)
that he fulfils that condition under which alone the law excuses a
madman who has done an act otherwise criminal." That the onus
of -either issue should lie on the accused, appears to Oppenheimer
out of harmony with the teachings of medical science, and justly
so for the second issue. "It ought to be laid down as a rule of evidence that those proved to be of unsound mind should be assumed,
till the contrary be shown, not to know the nature and quality of
their acts and that that which they were doing was wrong." Another presumption is that "even in the case of an acknowledged lunatic," it is'said, "the offense is presumed to have been committed in
a lucid interval, unless the contrary be shown." To this he justly
opposes the principle that strikes root in the United States that
"where previous insanity is proved, the prosecution must show that
the crime was committed during a lucid interval." Oppenheimer's
semi-legal discussion of how a lucid interval, and an intermission and
a remission should be defined is itself proof enough for the desirability of this departure from English precedent.
The last chapter makes an appeal to limiting expert testimony,
510
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to experts called by the court; if possible, with the privilege of examination in a hospital.
We deal, in this book, with an author of unusual erudition, as
shown in his quotations, literary and legal, with a remarkably simple
and clear diction, a wide grasp of the laws, but lacking in the essential objectivity which only the casuistic method can bring, and, with
all his ingenuity, turning in a circle under the cover -of the perplexing number of issues.
AMy own feeling is that a solution will demand, first of all, a
clearer subdivision of issues, and rules which will-make it obligatory
to raise all the essential questions, with regard to each of at least
the following three issues: The guilt or intent problem, the punishment (as threat or otherwise) and the preventive measures, apart
from what punishment entails.
We must rise above a mere definition of words. It is a question
worth debating, whether the word insanity, and probably even the
word responsibility, had not best be banished in order'that we may
get at the real facts. No test and no definition' in biological and
sociological problems can cover all cases adequately; therefore, why
should we look for it and neglect the more essential points over the
vain effort? The question is, rather, whether a test can do harm, so
that it would have to be eliminated. The great variety of laws serving in other countries certainly gives me an inspiration to expect
salvation from other directions, rather than from debates over definitions or terminology of tests.
The great effect of such a purely legal discussion is the implication that words and their definition by themselves determine the
decisions. The decisions are always made by the.judge or a jury,
or at least some human beings chosen with some sense and led by
the available rules. Law which leaves out human judgment is like
science which leaves out common sense. In justice to Oppenheimer,
we must say that he has produced a very readable and able legal
thesis on the concept of criminal responsibility, but incidentally a
demonstration of the uselessness of expecting our salvation from
words and concepts alone. If another thesis would inquire as ably
into the question why we do not adopt the English formula of the
verdict, "guilty, but insane," instead of the hopelessly misleading
verdict of "not guilty, on ground of insanity," or into the problem
of crime of passion and under provocation, or into the question why
the jury has no third alternative beside the verdict which means,
oeath and that which means complete freedom-we might gradually
get nearer a solution satisfying common sense and physicians alike.
That this might be obtainable by singling out the incompatible
issues and settling them by themselves instead of lumping them into
one issue of guilty or not guilty, would furnish another fertile topic
of constructive legal study.
A.M.

